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Runway incursion is the safety management core of civil airports, and the influencing factor of runway incursion is a hot topic in the practical and 
academic circles. To identify key influencing factors and determine interaction ways, typical runway incursions were analyzed using the software-
hardware-environment-liveware model (SHELL). Fifteen influencing factors were identified and extracted. The centrality and cause of influencing factors 
were calculated by decision-making trial and evaluation laboratory (DEMATEL) and interpretative structural modelling (ISM). A multi-layer 
interpretative structural model was constructed for layering of influencing factors. Results indicate that inadequate attention of airport leaders to safety is 
the root factor. System formulation and educational training are deep influencing factors. Oversight and the operation error rate of ground officials are 
direct influencing factors. Runway incursion could be fundamentally controlled and prevented by improving the root factor. The proposed DEMATEL-
ISM method can analyze the influencing factors of runway incursions and their influencing mechanism, thereby offsetting the shortcomings of the linear 
risk factor statistical model and offering a novel decision-making idea and approach for runway incursion control. 
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Utjecajni čimbenici rizika za upad na pistu i njihov mehanizam interakcije temeljen na DEMATEL-ISM 
Izvorni znanstveni članak 
Upad na pistu je središnja jezgra sigurnosti civilnih zračnih luka, a čimbenik koji utječe na upad na pistu je vruća tema u praktičnim i akademskim 
krugovima. Da bi identificirali ključne čimbenike koji utječu i utvrdili načine interakcije, uobičajeni upadi na pistu analizirani su pomoću modela softver-
hardver-okruženje-osoblje (SHELL). Utvrđeno je i izdvojeno petnaest vrsta utjecaja. Usmjernost i uzrok utjecajnih čimbenika izračunati su pomoću 
probnog i evaluacijskog laboratorija (DEMATEL) i interpretativnog strukturnog modeliranja (ISM). Izrađen je višeslojni interpretativni strukturni model 
za raslojavanje čimbenika koji utječu na njih. Rezultati pokazuju da je temeljni čimbenik neodgovarajuća pozornost čelnika zračne luke prema sigurnosti. 
Formuliranje sustava i edukacijsko obrazovanje su čimbenici od najvećeg utjecaja. Previd i stopa pogrešaka u radu službenika na tlu izravni su utjecajni 
čimbenici. Upad na pistu mogao bi se temeljito kontrolirati i spriječiti poboljšavanjem temeljnog čimbenika. Predložena metoda DEMATEL-ISM može 
analizirati čimbenike koji utječu na upade na pistu i mehanizam koji dovodi do njih, čime se nadoknađuju nedostaci statističkog modela linearnog faktora 
rizika i nudi nova ideja odlučivanja i pristupa za kontrolu upada na pistu. 
Ključne riječi: analiza rizika; DEMATEL; ISM; mehanizam interakcije; upad na pistu 
1 Introduction 
Safety incidents caused by runway incursion in 
airports have been increasingly frequent in recent years. 
Transport Canada reported that the 20 % growth of airport 
traffic will increase runway incursion risk by 140 %. 
Runway incursion is widely accepted as one of the most 
important risk sources in civil aviation airports. 
According to the International Civil Aviation 
Organization (ICAO), runway incursion refers to any 
occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect 
presence of an aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected 
area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off 
of aircraft. The airport surface protection zone in an 
airport covers the runway, taxiway, and soil surface areas 
at two sides within 75 m to the middle line of the runway. 
Runway incursion is not only sensitive to environment 
and hardware systems (e.g. airport facilities, 
meteorological conditions, and aircraft state), but is also 
closely related to the judgment and operation of aviators 
and air traffic controllers and the management behaviors 
of airport officials. In addition, a complicated relationship 
exists among the different factors. Therefore, identifying 
influencing factors and their interaction mechanism and 
determining risk transmission paths are the bases of 
effective incursion risk control. 
However, most of the existing studies on runway 
incursion influencing factors focus on the statistical 
analysis of the improper behaviors of subjects, such as 
pilots, air traffic controllers, personnel, and vehicles [1, 2]. 
Insufficient attention is given to organizational factors 
(e.g. safety training, system performance, safety culture, 
and organization culture) and internal psychological 
factors (e.g. safety consciousness, skill and experiences, 
and job burnout). Studies on the evolution mechanism of 
runway incursion are mainly based on multi-agent 
modeling simulations and analyze impacts of human error 
through temporal and logical ideas [3]. Moreover, the 
hierarchy and interaction of risk factors are hardly 
discussed in studies concerning the assessment of runway 
incursion risk. Existing research on runway incursion 
mainly highlights the behavioral mistakes of subjects, but 
hardly discusses organization management factors, the 
psychological factors of employees, and the interaction of 
influencing factors, especially the causality and action 
mechanism of influencing factors. In this study, the 
influencing factors of runway incursion were screened 
from the personnel, machine, environment, and 
management perspectives. The relationship and relation 
strength among different factors were analyzed. Root 
factors and deep and direct influencing factors were 
identified and the risk transmission paths in the system 
were determined. Countermeasures to runway incursion 
were proposed to reduce runway incursion risks. 
2 State of the art 
With respect to the influencing factors of runway 
incursion, existing studies mainly analyzed the correlation 
between the incursion data and the influencing factors and 
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determined the influence degrees of every factor through 
mathematical statistics. Huo and Han [1] performed 
multiple regression analyses of incursion results and 
influencing factors through the least square method and 
found that typical error influences runway incursion 
significantly. They concluded that improper airfield 
management, runway invasion of people and vehicles, 
poor coordination in civil and military airports, 
insufficient personnel training, and the absence of runway 
incursion consciousness are the main influencing factors. 
Zhang and Yang [2] analyzed the correlation between 
accident causes, namely, pilot deviation (PD), operational 
error/deviation (OE/OD), and vehicle/pedestrian deviation 
(V/PD), and event severity. They reported that the key to 
preventing A and B types of runway incursion is to 
enhance the access administration of pedestrian and 
vehicle drivers to the airfield and improve the quality of 
their communication, while the key to preventing C and D 
types of runway incursion is to train pilots to obey laws 
and rules. Luo, Liu, and Li [4] determined the scale and 
the weight coefficient of accident causes based on the G1 
method and expert empirical analysis, including minimum 
approaching distance, visibility/runway visual 
range/cloud base height, runway braking condition, 
remedial measure, communication status, controller 
deviation, and pilot deviation, and constructed a 
mathematical algorithm model of runway incursion 
severity. Feigh and Bruneau [5] pointed out from the 
statistical analysis of accidents that over one-third of the 
most serious runway incursions are caused by PD, and the 
absence of situational awareness is the major cause of PD. 
Adam et al. [6] discussed the human risks of runway 
incursion and believed that most runway incursions are 
induced by the collaborative effect of multiple factors 
instead of their independent effects. Chang [7] argued that 
runway incursions are often caused by human mistakes, 
especially PD. PD mainly covers six aspects: pilot core 
competence, pilot-employee interaction, pilot-
organization interaction, pilot-environment interaction, 
pilot-software interaction, and pilot-hardware interaction. 
Numerous research results of runway incursion risk 
assessment exist. They generally follow the steps of index 
screening, weight determination, and comprehensive 
assessment. Fuzzy set theory, TOPSIS method [8], 
Gaussian Bayesian network model [9], event tree analysis 
(ETA), and cognitive reliability and error analysis method 
(CREAM) [10] are the major research methods. Kim and 
Yang et al. [11] determined the weights of the influencing 
factors of runway incursion in the Gimpo International 
Airport in Korea through the analytic hierarchy process 
(AHP). They assessed the possibility and harmfulness of 
runway incursion risks through the fault tree analysis and 
found that human mistakes can influence runway 
incursion risk significantly. Lin [12] divided the 
influencing factors of runway incursion into superficial 
and implicit factors, constructed the Gaussian Bayesian 
network model of runway incursion, and analyzed the 
causes and mechanism of runway incursion according to 
the direct relationships of factors and conditional 
probability. Gao and Luo [13] discussed the hidden 
danger, possible causes, and consequences of runway 
incursion based on the Bowtie model. They emphasized 
risk and organization control. Several researchers have 
assessed runway incursion risk using other methods. For 
example, Tian and Zhou et al. [3] analyzed the evolution 
mechanism of runway incursion risks based on the multi-
agent dynamic simulation method. From the variability 
and interaction of a complicated system, Stroeve and 
Blom et al. [14] assessed the safety risk of runway 
incursion by establishing a sequential epidemics accident 
model and implemented a simulation using the Monte 
Carlo method. Landry and Chen et al. [15] recognized and 
tested runway incursion risks based on the complex 
network theory and established and verified the model of 
Hartsfield International Airport in Atlanta. 
To sum up, existing studies on runway incursion give 
significant attention to direct causes, such as the operation 
error and deviation of frontline staffs, including pilots, air 
traffic controllers, and ground officials, whereas the 
management and psychological factors of employees are 
hardly discussed. Existing studies emphasize 
mathematical statistics, comprehensive evaluation, and 
behavioral simulation analysis rather than the mechanism 
of runway incursion and the interaction of different 
factors. The influencing mechanism of risk factors and the 
evolution process of runway incursions remain a mystery. 
Considering the shortcomings of existing studies, the 
influencing factors of runway incursion were identified in 
this study through the SHELL model. The influencing 
factors were extracted and defined by combining case 
study and questionnaire survey. An impact matrix was 
established by the decision-making trial and evaluation 
laboratory (DEMATEL) method to calculate the centrality 
and cause of influencing factors. Influencing factors with 
strong interaction were screened by setting a threshold, 
and all interactions were determined by interpretative 
structural modelling (ISM), which helps controllers 
comprehend the keys of risk control. 
The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 
3 introduces the method for extracting the influencing 
factors of runway incursion, the establishment of the 
impact and reachable matrices, the calculation of 
centrality and cause, and ISM construction. Section 4 




3.1 Analysis of influencing factors 
 
The extraction of influencing factors is the basis for 
analyzing the influencing mechanism. The influencing 
factors of runway incursion cover human, aircraft, 
environment, and management, including subject (pilot, 
air traffic controllers, and ground vehicle drivers) errors, 
organization safety management, safety environmental 
factors, and safety facilities. Combinations of influencing 
factors were analyzed using the SHELL model. In the 
SHELL model, S stands for software, H stands for 
hardware, E stands for environment, and L stands for 
liveware. Four components in the SHELL model are 
dependent on each other and the interfaces between staff 
factors and other factors. L-L relationships mainly include 
support, cooperation, and communication. L-H interprets 
the relationship between related works and airborne 
equipment. These interfaces are as follows: 
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(1) L-H interface. It reflects interactions between 
related workers and airborne equipment, navigation 
equipment, and airport surface equipment. L-H interface 
influences the interaction degree between workers and 
machines in real operations, such as reasonable cabin 
altitude and recognizable light color switchover device. 
(2) L-S interface. It reflects the interactions between 
workers in the workplace and the applied software or 
documents of the Airline Company or Air Traffic 
Management Bureau, such as standard operation manual, 
computer program software, and table of aircrafts. 
(3) L-L interface. It refers to the cooperation and 
coordination of related workers when protecting the 
safety operation of aircrafts, such as the final decision of 
the management layer of different departments, the 
cooperation between the unit and the air traffic controller, 
the cooperation between air traffic controllers, and the 
coordination and communication between ground 
officials and air traffic controllers. 
(4) L-E interface. It refers to the adaptation of 
workers to internal and external environments and their 
relationship. Internal environment mainly includes 
cockpit environment, control room environment, and 
enterprise culture of units, while external environment 
mainly refers to policies or the macroscopic control of the 
country and the civil airline company. 
The influencing factors of runway incursion were 
extracted by combining the SHELL model and a typical 
case study. They were further screened according to a 
questionnaire survey, and the final influencing factor set 
was determined. 
 
3.2 Influencing factor model of runway incursion 
 
Both DEMATEL and ISM are system structural 
modeling approaches. They analyze the relationship 
between any two factors in the system using matrices and 
the graph theory. DEMATEL emphasizes calculating the 
direct relation strength in the system, distinguishing 
causal and consequence factors, identifying the key 
factors of a complicated system and their influence 
degrees. ISM emphasizes decomposing a complicated 
system into several subsystems according to the 
relationships of factors and constructing a hierarchical 
ISM. The organic combination of DEMATEL and ISM 
cannot only analyze the hierarchical structure of the 
complicated system comprehensively, but can also 
identify the key factors in the system and their influence 
degrees. The analysis steps are shown in Fig. 1 [16]. 
 












Figure 1 Calculation steps of DEMATEL–ISM method 
 
3.2.1 Direct impact matrix 
 
The direct impact degree and the impact matrix 
among different factors are determined. The relation 
strength between two factors is evaluated into five classes 
using a 5-point Likert-type scale and the Delphi method 
as follows: very strong (4), strong (3), general (2), weak 
(1), and unrelated (0). The relationship and relation 
strength among influencing factors are judged by civil 
aviation and airport management experts. According to 
the investigation results, the direct impact matrix X = 
(xij)n×n is obtained, where xij is the direct impact degree of 
Ai on Aj and xij = 0 when i = j. 
 
3.2.2 Total impact matrix 
 
Direct impact matrix X is normalized, and normalized 


















xMax1                                                 (1) 
 
DEMATEL comprehensively considers the indirect 
relationship among factors through Eq. (2): 
 
1)( −−∗= DIDT                                                            (2) 
 
where T is the total impact matrix and I is the unit matrix. 
Tij is the direct and indirect influences of  Ai on Aj or the 
total influence of Ai on Aj. 
 
3.2.3 Determination of centrality and cause 
 
In total impact matrix T, the sum of elements in one 
row shows the total influence of each factor on other 
factors and is called the degree of impact (R). The sum of 
elements in one column is the total influence of other 
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factors on the corresponding factor and is called the 
degree of being impacted (C). The sum of R and C is the 
centrality (R + C), which expresses the role and effect of 
the factor in the system. The higher the centrality is, the 
stronger the influence of this factor on runway incursion 







































ij rtC                                                   (4) 
 
If R – C > 0, then this factor influences the runway 
incursion significantly and is more important than the 
other factors. It influences other factors positively and is a 
cause factor. If R – C < 0 then this factor is susceptible to 
other factors and influences runway incursion indirectly. 
It is a consequence factor. The cause and consequence 
factors reflect the impact characteristics of factors. The R 
and C of every factor can be calculated according to Eq. 
(3) and Eq. (4), thus the CR +  and CR −  of the factor 
can be calculated. 
 
3.2.4 Reachable matrix 
 
Weak relations are eliminated by setting a threshold 
(λ). The system structure is simplified, and the 
hierarchical structure is clear. On the basis of the logic 
judgment from Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), T can be transformed 
into the reachable matrix K, where kij is the elements of K. 
λ influences the composition of K and the subsequent 
hierarchical structure division. λ can be determined by 
multiple value analyses according to experiences. 
 
If ( )njitij  ..., 2, 1, , =≥ λ    1=ijk                                   (5) 
If ( )njitij  ..., 2, 1, , =≤ λ    0=ijk                                   (6) 
 
3.2.5 Hierarchical ISM 
 
On the basis of reachable matrix K, the reachable set 
Ri and antecedent set Si of every factor can be determined 
as follows: 
 
{ } ) ..., 2, 1, ,(1 , , njikAkAaaR ijijjii ===∈=     (7) 
{ } ) ..., 2, 1, ,(1 , , njikAkAaaS ijjijii ===∈=     (8) 
 
where A is the factor set. 
Depending on whether Eq. (9) or Eq. (10) is true, the 
risk factor sets of the different levels are divided 
according to the cause or consequence priority algorithm, 
thus obtaining the hierarchical ISM of risk factors. 
 
iii RSR =∩    ( )ni  ..., 2, 1,=                                          (9) 
iii SSR =∩    ( )ni  ..., 2, 1,=                                         (10) 
 
 
4 Result analysis and discussion 
4.1 Influencing factor set of runway incursion 
 
A total of 149 A-type runway incursion events from 
2001–2016 were collected based on the FAA runway 
incursion database (RWS), including 72 caused by PD 
(48.%), 59 caused by OE/OD (40.%), and 18 caused by 
V/PD (12.%). On the basis of the analysis description of 
runway incursion samples in RWS, the occurrence 
frequencies of influencing factors were analyzed and 
ranked using the SHELL model. Those with low 
occurrence frequency were eliminated. On this basis, 
influencing factors were further screened through expert 
interviews through E-mail and telephone and video 
conferences in December of 2016. All interviewees were 
scholars of airport safety management or middle and 
senior managers of enterprises, including 3 from China 
Academy of Civil Aviation Science and Technology, 5 
from CAAC Central and Southern Regional 
Administration, 5 from the management department of 
Wuhan Tianhe Airport, and 5 from China Eastern 
Airlines. Finally, 15 influencing factors (Fig. 2) were 
recognized by analyzing the interview results. These 
influencing factors cover employee individuals, 
operational management, operating conditions, and safety 
culture. The influencing factor set is A = (Ai)1∗n i = 1, 2, 
…, 15. 
 
4.1.1 Employee individuals 
 
Pilot, air traffic controllers, and ground vehicle 
drivers are subjects who participate directly in runway 
incursion. Individual factors that influence their mistakes 
or violation behaviors include biographical 
characteristics, unqualified knowledge and skill, weak 
safety consciousness, heavy work load, and high rate of 
judgment and operational error. 
A1: Biographical characteristics. They refer to age; 
gender; civil status; family composition; educational 
background; alcohol, tobacco, and drug dependence; and 
personality characteristics. They can influence the 
judgment, concentration, and working enthusiasm of 
subjects directly. 
A2: Unqualified knowledge and skill. It reflects the 
unfamiliarity of subjects on safety knowledge, safety 
operation rules, tools and equipment, airport layout, signs 
and environment. 
A3: Weak safety consciousness. This means that staff 
individuals are hardly aware of the external 
environmental factors that may induce runway incursion 
and have poor consciousness on safe operation rules, and 
operation randomness is strong. For example, the pilot 
does not obey the commands of air traffic controllers 
strictly and the driver does not obey the commands of 
running routes and the ground controller strictly. 
A4: Heavy work load. It refers to the influences of the 
working time and intensity of individual staff on their 
conformation with safe operation rules for the safe 
running of the working system. Work overload easily 
decreases the judgment and response rate and increases 
staff errors. 
A5: High rate of judgment and operational error. It 
refers to the decreased judgment accuracy of pilots, air 
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traffic controllers, and drivers caused by negligence, 
fatigue, and loss of scene consciousness, which lead to 
incorrect operations or commands. These are often the 
direct causes of runway incursion. 
 
4.1.2 Operational management 
 
Operational management factors that influence 
runway incursion include oversight of ground officials, 
absent safety management system, invalid safety 
management system, and poor safety education. 
A6: Oversight of ground officials. It refers to the 
measures of ground officials to correct, punish, or tolerate 
the violating behaviors of vehicles and people in the 
administering region to maintain the smoothness of 
runway regions. 
A7: Absent safety management system. It refers to the 
imperfect and impractical safety management 
specifications and systems in airports and the lack of 
consulting opinions of air traffic controllers, pilots, and 
other ground officials. 
A8: Invalid safety management system. It refers to the 
ground officials in airports that do not follow safety 
specifications and systems strictly. 
A9: Poor safety education. It refers to the inadequate 
training of pilots, air traffic controllers, drivers, and 
ground officials on business skills, safety consciousness, 
and safety management system.  
 




B3  Operating conditions
B4  Safety culture
A1 Biographical characteristics of Employee 
A2 Unqualified knowledge and skill
A3 Weak  safety consciousness
A4 Heavy work load
A5 High rate of judgment and operational error
A6 Oversight of ground officials
A7 Absent safety management system
A8 Invalid safety management system
A9 Poor safety education
A10 Poor airport surface conditions
A11 Busy airport business
A12 Complicated meteorological conditions
A13 Low-quality communication equipments
A15 Weak safety culture
A14 Inadequate attention of airport leaders to safety
 
Figure 2 Rotary seal device for high-pressure water 
 
4.1.3 Operating conditions 
 
The operating conditions that influence runway 
incursion include poor airport surface conditions, busy 
airport business, complicated meteorological conditions, 
and low-quality communication equipment. 
A10: Poor airport surface conditions. Airport surface 
conditions inadequately satisfy airport operation. Airport 
surface signs and assisting facilities are not arranged 
according to the requirements. The airport surface layout 
is complicated and unreasonable. 
A11: Busy airport business. Given limited runways 
and air traffic control facilities, the more the departure 
and approaching aircrafts at a unit time are, the higher the 
runway incursion risk will be. 
A12: Complicated meteorological conditions. 
Meteorological conditions, such as visibility, runway 
visual range, wind speed, wind direction and shear, and 
thunderstorm and rainfall, influence the judgment 
accuracy and maloperation rate of air traffic controllers 
and pilots directly, thus affecting the taxiing of aircrafts. 
A13: Low-quality communication equipments. It 
reflects the perfection and advance degree of aircrafts, 
airport scene traffic and communication equipment, 
friendly degree of human-machine interface, operation 
difficulty of facilities and equipment, and standard degree 
of daily maintenance.  
 
4.1.4 Safety culture 
 
The safety culture factors of runway incursion 
include inadequate attention of airport leaders on safety 
and weak safety culture. 
A14: Inadequate attention of airport leaders to safety. 
Leaders of airports and airlines pay imbalanced attention 
to safety and production and resource input. 
A15: Weak safety culture. It reflects the attitude of the 
whole organization toward safety and of the staff toward 
mistakes and the violations of others. 
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4.2 Analysis of centrality and cause 
4.2.1 Calculate the impact matrix of influencing factor set 
 
The influencing factors of runway incursion form a 
complicated system. Different factors have direct and 
indirect relationships. Relation strength is mainly 
determined through the Delphi method and the opinions 
of multiple experts [17]. The 5-point Likert-type scale 
was designed according to the influencing factor set. A 
total of 56 questionnaires were sent to the aviation safety 
experts and airport managers of the China Academy of 
Civil Aviation Science and Technology, CAAC, Wuhan 
Tianhe Airport, and China Eastern Airlines from March to 
April of 2017. Among them, 45 questionnaires were 
collected, including 21 from professional technicians, 13 
from airport managers, and 11 from the frontline staffs of 
airports. On the basis of the idea of Shaik, Cebi, Hsu and 
Liou et al. [18-23], questionnaire data were processed by 
the integrated rule of the averaging method. To protect the 
scale and the algorithm validity, the average values were 
rounded-off to determine the direct relation strength 
between every two factors. The direct impact matrix (X) 
of the influencing factor set was established (Tab. 1). 
X  was normalized according to Eq. (1) and the total 
impact matrix (T) was calculated according to Eq. (2) 
(Tab. 2). 
 
Table 1 Direct impact matrix (X) of influencing factors of runway incursion 
X  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
A1 0 4 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
A2 0 0 4 0 4 3 0 2 0 0 0 0 2 0 2 
A3 0 2 0 0 3 4 0 2 1 2 0 0 2 0 3 
A4 0 0 3 0 0 3 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A6 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 3 
A7 3 3 3 3 2 4 0 4 3 1 0 0 2 0 3 
A8 4 4 3 3 3 4 1 0 3 3 0 0 3 0 4 
A9 0 4 4 0 4 3 1 3 0 1 0 0 2 3 4 
A10 0 0 0 3 4 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 0 
A11 0 0 0 4 3 3 0 0 2 3 0 0 1 3 3 
A12 0 0 0 4 3 2 0 2 0 3 2 0 2 0 0 
A13 0 0 0 4 0 3 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 
A14 3 3 4 2 1 4 4 4 3 2 1 0 3 0 4 
A15 1 2 4 1 2 4 3 3 3 1 0 0 1 1 0 
 
Table 2 Total impact matrix (T) of influencing factors of runway incursion 
T  A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
A1 0.01  0.13  0.14  0.02  0.12  0.05  0.01  0.04  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.11  
A2 0.01  0.03  0.13  0.03  0.14  0.13  0.01  0.09  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.08  0.00  0.09  
A3 0.02  0.08  0.04  0.04  0.12  0.16  0.01  0.10  0.05  0.07  0.01  0.00  0.09  0.01  0.12  
A4 0.02  0.03  0.10  0.02  0.03  0.12  0.01  0.13  0.02  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  0.04  
A5 0.01  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.06  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.00  0.01  
A6 0.02  0.02  0.03  0.08  0.05  0.04  0.01  0.11  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.11  
A7 0.11  0.14  0.16  0.13  0.14  0.20  0.02  0.18  0.11  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.11  0.01  0.16  
A8 0.12  0.16  0.16  0.13  0.17  0.20  0.05  0.09  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.00  0.13  0.01  0.19  
A9 0.03  0.16  0.18  0.06  0.18  0.18  0.06  0.16  0.04  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.11  0.09  0.19  
A10 0.00  0.01  0.01  0.10  0.11  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.01  0.03  0.00  0.06  0.00  0.01  
A11 0.02  0.04  0.06  0.15  0.13  0.15  0.02  0.07  0.08  0.10  0.01  0.00  0.07  0.09  0.13  
A12 0.01  0.02  0.03  0.14  0.11  0.10  0.01  0.09  0.01  0.09  0.06  0.00  0.08  0.01  0.03  
A13 0.01  0.01  0.03  0.13  0.02  0.11  0.01  0.03  0.01  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.02  0.01  0.08  
A14 0.12  0.16  0.21  0.13  0.14  0.24  0.13  0.21  0.13  0.10  0.04  0.00  0.15  0.02  0.22  
A15 0.06  0.11  0.17  0.08  0.13  0.20  0.10  0.15  0.11  0.06  0.01  0.00  0.08  0.04  0.08  
 
4.2.2 Calculate centrality and cause 
 
The total impact degree of the influencing factor set 
was calculated according to Eq. (3) and Eq. (4). The 
results are shown in Tab. 3. C stands for the total impact 
degree of the other influencing factors on the test factor, 
and R represents the total impact degree of the test factor 
on other factors. N = R – C is the cause and M = R + C is 
the centrality. The cause-and-effect diagram of the 
influencing factors was drawn using M as the y-axis and N 
as the x-axis (Fig. 3). 
 
Table 3 Total impact of influencing factors of runway incursion 
 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
C 0.67 0.79 0.90 0.55 0.18 0.59 1.56 1.65 1.52 0.42 1.09 0.78 0.52 2.00 1.38 
R 0.55 1.10 1.47 1.27 1.60 1.93 0.45 1.53 0.75 0.73 0.24 0.00 1.11 0.30 1.57 
N = R − C 0.12 −0.30 −0.57 −0.71 −1.42 −1.34 1.11 0.12 0.77 −0.30 0.85 0.78 −0.59 1.70 −0.20 
M = R + C 1.22 1.89 2.37 1.82 1.78 2.52 2.01 3.18 2.27 1.15 1.33 0.78 1.63 2.31 2.95 
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4.2.3 Cause-and-effect analysis of influencing factor set 
 
(1) Analysis of the importance of factors 
Tab. 3 shows that A8, A15, A6, A14, A9 and A3 have high 
centrality (R + C) values, indicating that they have great 
impacts on runway incursion. Among them, A8 is a 
connecting factor in the influencing factor set and is 
influenced by causal factors and influences the 
consequence factors. This indicates that executing safety 
management systems and regulations strictly is the major 
means of incursion risk control. Fig. 3 shows that these 
factors occupy important nodes and are closely related 
with other factors. A12, A10, A1 and A11 are less important, 
indicating that they are relatively independent from other 
factors. 
(2) Analysis of causal factors 
Tab. 3 shows that factors with positive R – C values 
are cause factors and occupy the right region of Fig. 3. A14 
shows the highest R – C, followed by A7, A11, A12, A9, A1 
and A8 successively. Among them, A14 influences other 
factors most and is recognized as the root cause. A7 and A8 
are important management means that affect the 
behaviors of subjects, such as pilots, air traffic controllers, 
and drivers. A9 and A1 can avoid negligence and 
operational error by improving the safety concept and 
operational skills of employees. A11 and A12 are less 




Figure 3 Influence relationship diagram of influencing factors 
 
(3) Analysis of consequence factors 
Tab. 4 shows that factors with negative R – C values 
are consequence factors that occupy the left region of Fig. 
3. A5 has the highest absolute R – C value, followed by 
A6, A4, A3, A2, A15 and A10 successively. A5 and A6 are the 
most sensitive consequence factors to other factors and 
consistent with management practices. They are direct 
causes of runway incursion. A4, A3 and A2 influence 
runway incursion indirectly by A5. A15 and A10 represent 
hardware facilities and are environmental factors. They 
can influence A5 and A6 indirectly. 
 
4.3 ISM analysis 
4.3.1 Establishment of ISM 
 
From the associated achievements perspective, λ can 
be determined in three ways. The first one is through the 
multi-expert joint determination method [24, 25], which 
emphasizes the joint determination of multiple experts 
ambiguously, but does not illustrate how to eliminate the 
error from the subjectivity of experts. The second one is 
through the averaging method [19, 26], which determines 
λ by calculating the mean of elements in T. The third one 
is through the determination method based on statistical 
distribution [27]. It proposes that λ = μ + 0.5σ and is an 
extension of the averaging method, where μ and σ are the 
mean and the standard deviation of elements in T. It 
considers the internal law of normal data distribution. In 
this study, the threshold was determined by the third one. 
μ = 0.065 and σ = 0.0608. 
Therefore, λ = μ + 0.5σ = 0.0954. 
By substituting λ = 0.0954 into Eq. (5) and Eq. (6), 
the weak relationships of the factors are eliminated. The 
reachable matrix (K) of the influencing factor set was 
constructed (Tab. 4). The reachable and antecedent sets of 
the influencing factors were determined according to Eq. 
(7) and Eq. (8). The factors were layered according to Eq. 
(9) and Eq. (10). The results are shown in Tab. 5. ISM 
was established according to the consequence priority 
(Fig. 4). Grey nodes are causal factors and the rest are 
consequence factors. 
 
Table 4 Reachable matrix K of influencing factors of runway incursion 
K A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 A13 A14 A15 
A1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A2 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A3 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A4 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
A7 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 
A8 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
A9 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
A10 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A11 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
A12 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A13 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
A14 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 
A15 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
 
Table 5 Layering of influencing factors of runway incursion 
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No. Layer Cause priority Consequence priority Common factors Activity factors Factors of different layers Factors of different layers 
0 Super layer 5, 6 5, 6 5, 6  
1 Middle layer 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 15 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 15, 10 1, 2, 3, 4, 13, 15 10 
2 Deep layer 7, 8, 9 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 7, 8, 9 11, 12 

















Figure 4 ISM of influencing factors of runway incursion 
 
4.3.2 ISM analysis 
 
Tab. 5 shows that A14 is in Layer 3 and is the root 
cause of runway incursion. Therefore, airports shall 
improve safety management in the strategic level. The 
attention of airport senior managers on safety influences 
runway incursion indirectly through A7, A8, and A9, which 
are in Layer 2. Perfection and the strict implementation of 
systems as well as training are deep factors that prevent 
runway incursion. A5 and A6 are in Layer 0 in Tab. 5 and 
are superficial and direct causes of runway incursion. 
These prove the internal consistency between DEMATEL 
and ISM. A1, A2, A3, A4, A13 and A15 are in Layer 1 of the 
ISM. They influence A5 and A6, but are influenced by deep 
and root factors. They are in the middle layer. 
The activity factors in ISM are the exogenous 
variables of the system or are slightly influenced by other 
factors. They are the keys of system analysis. A10, A11 and 
A12 are the activity factors in the ISM, and no superior 
factors exist, indicating that they are less influenced by 
external factors. This conforms to the results of 
DEMATEL. Airport shall enhance countermeasures for 
tough meteorological conditions and the busy state, and 
improve airport surface conditions. These factors are free 
from the intervention of the upper layer and easily induce 
runway incursion. 
ISM has multiple risk transmission paths (Fig. 4). The 
dominant way is 14A → 7A ＋ 8A ＋ 9A → 15A ＋ 2A ＋
3A → 5A ＋ 6A . This is the improved way of runway 
incursion control. The senior safety management of 
airports influences 5A and 6A through different ways. 
Attention should be given to the positive enhancement of 




The influencing factors of runway incursion and their 
interaction mechanism were discussed in this study. Direct 
relationships among influencing factors and relation 
strengths were analyzed through DEMATEL and ISM. 
The cause-and-effect diagram and ISM were established 
and used to determine the importance of influencing 
factors, respectively. Root causes, deep influencing 
factors, and direct influencing factors were identified. The 
following conclusions are drawn: 
(1) The cause and effect of influencing factors can be 
distinguished better based on DEMATEL–ISM. 
Inadequate attention of leaders to safety (A14), absent 
safety management system (A7), busy airport business 
(A11), and complicated meteorological conditions (A12) are 
cause factors, while the high rate of judgment and 
operational error (A5), the oversight of ground officials 
(A6), heavy work load (A4), and weak safety consciousness 
(A3) are consequence factors. Cause factors influence 
consequence factors. 
(2) Influencing factors can be layered and risk 
transmission paths can be determined accurately by 
DEMATEL–ISM. The inadequate attention of leaders to 
safety (A14) is the root cause of runway incursion. The 
absence of a safety management system (A7), invalid safety 
management system (A8), and poor safety education (A9) 
are deep influencing factors. The high rate of judgment 
and operational error (A5) and the oversight of ground 
officials (A6) are direct influencing factors and causes of 
runway incursion. The influencing paths of factors are 
paths to improving safety control. 
(3) The relationships among influencing factors and 
their interaction mechanism can be explored by 
DEMATEL–ISM. It provides a simple and reliable 
analysis model for recognizing the importance of risk 
factors, influencing layers, and influencing paths in 
aviation safety management. 
DEMATEL–ISM can divide the influencing factors of 
runway incursion into different layers. It focuses on the 
improvement of cause factors and corresponding 
countermeasures to control runway incursion risks better. 
"Inadequate attention of airport leaders to safety" is in the 
root layer. To avoid runway incursion risks, airport senior 
managers should give significant attention to safety, 
improve the "safety culture" of the organization by 
perfecting the "safety management system" and "safety 
education", enhance the "experiences and skills" and 
"safety consciousness" of the staff, promote the 
"implementation of safety management system", increase 
"ground supervision", and decrease the "judgment and 
operational error" of workers. 
The cause-and-effect diagram and ISM were 
established in this study and are conducive to identifying 
cause and consequence factors, layering of influencing 
factors, and determining risk transmission paths. They can 
provide accurate theoretical support to runway incursion 
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risk control. However, further studies on how runway 
incursion risks transmit to different layers and how to 
intercept transmission paths and enhance the runway 
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